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Lessons from 
Stuxnet
T
housands of new mal-
ware appear in the wild 
daily. Most are evolution-
ary variants of existing 
families and don’t have a widespread 
impact. However, occasionally a 
noteworthy new piece of malware 
will change the security landscape. 
For example, the 1988 Morris attack 
showed that an aggressive worm 
could bring down a substantial part of 
the Arpanet, and the 2003 SQL Slam-
mer attack demonstrated that a simple 
user datagram protocol (UDP)-based 
worm could create devastating net-
work congestion. 
Stuxnet is teaching the secu-
rity community new lessons. Since 
VirusBlokAda discovered the Win-
dows worm in Belarus in July 2010, 
researchers have studied it intensely. 
They believe Stuxnet spread for sev-
eral months before discovery and 
that it has already compromised its 
intended target. 
As Table 1 shows, Stuxnet differs 
from past malware in several ways. 
First, most malware tries to infect as 
many computers as possible, whereas 
Stuxnet appears to target industrial 
control systems and delivers its pay-
load under very speciic conditions. 
Second, Stuxnet is larger and more 
complex than other malware. It con-
tains exploits for four unpatched 
vulnerabilities—an unusually high 
number. The code is approximately 
500 Kbytes and written in multiple 
languages. As a reference, the SQL 
Slammer worm was 376 bytes; the 
Code Red worm was approximately 
4 Kbytes; the Nimda worm was 60 
Kbytes; and variants of the Zeus bank-
ing Trojan ranged between 40 and 150 
Kbytes. Virtually all malware is less 
than 1 Mbyte.   
Based on Stuxnet’s code, experts 
have speculated on its creators and 
intention. Its sophistication sug-
gests that the creators had detailed 
knowledge of its target and access 
to immense resources, perhaps with 
government backing. Its choice of tar-
gets also suggests a political motive. 
TARGET SELECTION 
Unlike most malware, Stuxnet tar-
gets industrial control systems, which 
are used widely in factories, assembly 
lines, reineries, and power plants. It 
attacks Windows PCs that program 
speciic Siemens programmable logic 
controllers—specialized comput-
ers that control automated physical 
processes, such as robot arms, in 
common industrial control systems. 
PLCs can have elaborate input/output 
arrangements for various applications 
in different physical environments. 
They often have sensors on the inputs 
(for example, for temperature), and 
the outputs typically operate equip-
ment such as motors, switches, and 
relays. 
Stuxnet targets vulnerable PCs run-
ning WinCC/Step 7 control software, 
which is normally used to program 
PLCs. When an infected PC connects 
to a Siemens Simatic PLC, Stuxnet 
installs a malicious .dll file, replac-
ing the PLC’s original .dll file. The 
malicious .dll ile lets Stuxnet moni-
tor and intercept all communication 
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Malware such as Stuxnet can affect critical physical infra-
structures that are controlled by software, which implies that 
threats might extend to real lives.
Table 1. Stuxnet’s novel characteristics.
Aspect Stuxnet Common malware
Targeting Extremely selective Indiscriminate
Type of target Industrial control systems Computers
Size 500 Kbytes Less than 1 Mbyte
Probable initial infection 
vector
Removable lash drive Internet and other networks
Exploits Four zero-days Possibly one zero-day
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uranium enrichment facility. The 
site’s production dropped 15 percent 
in 2009, around the time Stuxnet is 
believed to have begun spreading. In 
November 2010, Iran’s president con-
irmed that several centrifuges were 
hit by malware, which lends support 
to the theory that Stuxnet targeted 
Iran’s nuclear program. 
INSIDER KNOWLEDGE 
Stuxnet shows remarkably detailed 
knowledge of PLCs and industrial 
control systems. This type of infor-
mation isn’t published openly. For 
example, the creators knew that its 
target wouldn’t be reachable through 
the Internet. Thus, the initial infection 
vector might have been a removable 
flash drive. Stuxnet is designed to 
infect and hide in removable drives, 
using a Windows rootkit to prevent a 
PC owner from discovering Stuxnet 
iles. The lash drive allows only three 
infections, which attempt to spread 
for 21 days. This suggests an intent to 
limit the spreading rate, perhaps to 
maintain stealth.
Once installed on a local network, 
Stuxnet tries to ind vulnerable PCs 
and propagates through network 
shares. It copies itself to other Win-
dows PCs through a print spooler 
vulnerability (MS10-061) and con-
nects to other computers through 
the Server Message Block protocol 
and exploits a Windows Server Ser-
vice remote procedure call (RPC) 
vulnerability (MS08-067). In addi-
tion, it seeks servers running Siemens 
WinCC database software, which has 
a hard-coded password that can’t be 
changed or deleted. Stuxnet copies 
itself to the server by SQL injection. 
Stuxnet also demonstrates detailed 
knowledge of Siemens WinCC/Step 
7 software, relected in its ability to 
detect speciic conditions and modify 
code depending on the target PLC’s 
CPU. Stuxnet’s creators would have 
needed to know the target PLC’s con-
figuration, and probably required 
similar hardware to develop and test 
the malware code.  
EFFORT LEVEL
Stuxnet’s sophistication points to 
an unusually high effort level. Ilias 
Chantzos, director of government 
relations at Symantec, estimated 
the manpower required to develop 
Stuxnet to have been 5 to 10 people 
working for six months with access to 
Scada systems. All reports examining 
Stuxnet have agreed on the likelihood 
of at least one government’s involve-
ment in its development.  
Besides detailed insider knowledge 
of the target, other aspects suggest 
that Stuxnet’s creators expended 
considerable resources. The code 
contains an unprecedented four 
zero-day Windows exploits. Attack-
ers value zero-day exploits, so four 
represents an unusually high invest-
ment. The Conicker worm likewise 
exploited the Windows Server Service 
RPC vulnerability, for which Microsoft 
issued a patch in 2008, but Stuxnet’s 
creators seemed to know that patch-
ing Scada systems is time-consuming. 
Stuxnet is digitally signed by two 
certificates to appear legitimate. 
Initially, it used a stolen certificate 
from Realtek Semiconductor, but 
VeriSign revoked the certificate on 
16 July 2010. The next day, Stuxnet 
was found to be using a stolen certii-
cate from JMicron Technology, which 
was subsequently revoked on 22 July. 
The two companies are situated near 
each other, suggesting physical theft 
at those locations.   
Stuxnet goes to great lengths for 
additional stealth, but its techniques 
aren’t novel. It attempts to bypass 
popular security software by inject-
ing itself into a recognized process, 
between the PC and PLC. Depending 
on speciic PLC conditions, Stuxnet 
injects its own code onto the PLC in 
a manner undetectable by the PC 
operator. 
Whereas most malware payloads 
have a clear purpose, such as spam 
or data theft, Stuxnet’s intended goal 
is unknown. Security researchers 
believe that part of the injected code 
is intended to affect the frequency 
converter drives’ speed. The code 
appears to alternate between slowing 
down and speeding up the normal fre-
quency. Hypothetically, if the targeted 
PLC connects to a nuclear centrifuge, 
which is used for enriching uranium, 
the speed luctuations could cause the 
centrifuge to ly apart. However, the 
real-world result is dificult to guess 
because PLCs can connect to a variety 
of equipment.
According to measurements of its 
trafic to command and control serv-
ers, Stuxnet has infected an estimated 
50,000 to 100,000 computers, mainly 
in Iran (58 percent), Indonesia, India, 
and Azerbaijan (www.symantec.
com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/
security_response/whitepapers/w32_
stuxnet_dossier.pdf). Iran also has a 
high percentage of infected hosts 
that are running Siemens Step 7 soft-
ware—67 percent compared to other 
countries, where the infection rate is 
less than 13 percent. 
Iran’s high infection rate suggests 
a political motive. Based on his lab 
testing and dissection of the Stux-
net code, Ralph Langner—a German 
security expert familiar with indus-
trial systems—has suggested that the 
primary target was Iran’s Bushehr 
nuclear plant (www.langner.com/
en). Iranian oficials have denied that 
Stuxnet has caused any damage to 
the nuclear plant’s main systems; 
however, they did admit that some 
staff PCs had been infected. Oficials 
blamed a two-month delay in bring-
ing the reactor online on a leak in the 
plant’s fuel storage pool. 
Other experts have speculated that 
the primary target was Iran’s Natanz 
Once installed on a local 
network, Stuxnet tries 
to find vulnerable PCs 
and propagates through 
network shares.
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Stuxnet has also shown that isola-
tion from the Internet isn’t an effective 
defense, and an extremely motivated 
attacker might have an unexpected 
combination of inside knowledge, 
advanced skills, and vast resources. 
Existing technologies would have 
dificulty defending against this cali-
ber of attack. Indeed, Stuxnet might 
become the model for future genera-
tions of cyberoffense. 
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suitable as a “irst strike” weapon to 
compromise its target covertly before 
an overt offensive. 
After Stuxnet’s discovery, Iran 
accused NATO and the US of involve-
ment in the attacks, but both have 
denied responsibility. Some have 
also suspected Israel’s Unit 8200 
security agency. Israel hasn’t publicly 
commented on Stuxnet but acknowl-
edges that cyberwarfare is now part 
of its mission. Israel is far from the 
only nation with cyberwarfare capa-
bilities. The US established the Cyber 
Command (USCYBERCOM) at Fort 
Meade, Maryland, to defend Ameri-
can military networks. Other nations 
including the UK, China, and the Rus-
sian Federation are widely believed to 
be pursuing cyberwarfare capabilities 
as well.     
S
tuxnet has opened security 
researchers’ eyes to the fact 
that malware isn’t restricted 
to computers. Malware can affect 
critical physical infrastructures, 
which are mostly controlled by soft-
ware. This implies that threats might 
extend to real lives. 
then installing a Windows rootkit to 
hide in an infected PC. 
In addition, Stuxnet can update 
itself in two ways. An infected PC 
uses peer-to-peer communication to 
learn new updates. It also tries to con-
nect to command-and-control servers 
(initially in Malaysia and Denmark) 
to report system data culled from the 
infected system and download arbi-
trary executables.
CONSEQUENCES  
AND IMPLICATIONS
Although important details about 
Stuxnet—its creators, motives, target, 
and whether it has accomplished its 
goal—remain speculative, it has cer-
tainly reignited concerns about the 
possibility of cyberwarfare. Some 
experts perceive Stuxnet as the irst 
real cyberwarfare weapon. 
Fears of cyberwar were raised 
earlier by distributed denial-of-ser-
vice attacks on Estonia in mid-2007. 
However, a DDoS is a fairly simple 
brute-force attack. Stuxnet is far 
more sophisticated in its selectivity, 
stealth, self-protection, and self-
updating. Similar malware might be 
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